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This paper investigates the causal effect of the Great Recession, and a conditional effect of
a tuition fee reform, on the risk of students dropping out of HE. We use HESA data and our
analysis combines duration modelling with difference-in-differences. We find that the causal
effect of the recession increases the risk of drop out, especially for males. A smaller and positive
effect of the tuition fee reform for males, whereas we observe the opposite effect for females.
Differences in dropout behaviour are also found for high and low income groups, and between
different types of university and subjects studied.
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1 Introduction
Dropping out of education can be costly for individuals, especially if there is an increased risk of
unemployment and associated lower lifetime earnings (Arulampalam et al., 2005), for universities
insofar as income is reduced, and for society as a whole, especially when the state subsidy to
education is high. The Great Recession, which in the UK occured between 2007-2009, led to rising
rates of unemployment especially amongst school-leavers and graduates (Bell and Blanchflower,
2010). Substantial increases in unemployment are likely to create uncertainty regarding future
employment and wage prospects post-graduation and so may have also influenced student drop
out behaviour. Furthermore, countries like the US and the UK have witnessed an increase in
participation rates in higher education, and dropout rates have remained high as more marginal (in
terms of ability) students have enrolled on university courses. With the increase in participation
rates, and associated increased taxation to finance this expansion, it is no surprise that governments
should look for alternative funding mechanisms. In recent years, successive UK governments have
sought to reduce the subsidy to higher education and have pushed more of these costs onto the
beneficiaries of their education - the students.
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This paper estimates the effect of the recession (hereafter the recession effect), and the effect of
a tuition fee increase, which was introduced in the academic year 2006/07 (the reform effect), on the
dropout behaviour of first year university students in England. Our data show that approximately
one in ten students dropped out of their first year of study in the period 2004-2008, however, this
fell following the reform and the recession to around one in twenty first year students. The problem
of university drop out is therefore significant, so much so that it has become one of the metrics by
which universities are judged in the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF).1
This study adds to the literature on the impact of tuition fee reforms, and more generally the
effect of debt aversion, on student outcomes. It also extends the literature on dropout behaviour
which has primarily focused on high school students. Perhaps the main contribution of our paper,
however, is that we attempt to explicitly separate the effect of the recession from that of the tuition
fee reform. Our analysis combines duration analysis with difference-in-differences models, allowing
us to exploit spatial and temporal variations in the unemployment rates at local labor market level.
We use duration analysis because students can drop out at any point during the academic year, and
there are financial incentives to terminate study before the end of their first semester and before
the start of their second year of study (see Section 3.1). Duration analysis allows us to investigate if
students responded to these incentives which would imply a non-monotonic hazard of dropping out
of university. Employing standard linear models would only exploit the cross-sectional variation in
dropout rates, and hence we would lose one important feature of our data. The use of duration
analysis also enables us to control for the effects of unobserved student-level heterogeneity with
respect to the decision to drop out.
In this analysis, the ‘treatment’ is assumed to be the severity of local unemployment, which
is measured as a relatively large increase in the local travel-to-work area (TTWA) unemployment
rate.2 The local unemployment rate reflects the state of the local economy, particularly with respect
to the availability of jobs and ‘good’ wage offers, and these conditions shape expectations of future
labour market prospects, as well as the opportunity costs of education. The areas in the treated
group are compared with those experiencing a relatively smaller increase in the unemployment rate
(i.e. the control group). To ensure that the TTWAs have more similar ‘initial conditions’, we
create two categories of TTWAs by distinguishing between areas with ‘high’ and areas with ‘low’
unemployment rates. Within each category we are able to define more homogenous treatment and
control groups. This approach allows us to identify the causal effect of the Great Recession on
the incidence and timing of dropout behaviour, insofar as we exploit the fact that the recession
impacted local labour markets in a spatially uneven way. However, it is more difficult to identify
a causal effect of the policy reform on student drop out behaviour because we do not have data on
young people pre-enrolment, which means that we cannot model the decision of whether to go to
university or not. If the decision to participate in HE is endogenous to the decision to subsequently
drop-out, which is likely, then the effect of the policy reform on the drop out decision would be
biased, therefore, we argue that our estimate of the policy reform is at best a conditional effect.
Nevertheless, evaluating the effect of the policy reform, and disentangling this from the effect of
the recession, is still instructive for policy makers and practitioners. Section 4.2 explains how we
disentangle the reform effect from the recession effect. We also explore the issue of heterogeneity in
the effects of the recession and of the reform by exploring variations between students from different
1The TEF was introduced in 2014 and is a metric based approach to the analysis of the quality of teaching
delivered by universities. Metrics include the 1st year drop out rate, student satisfaction, the percentage of students
entering graduate level jobs and the percentage of students gaining a ‘good’ degree. Each university is classified as
either Gold, Silver or Bronze. Recently, the TEF has been extended to subject level.
2TTWAs are self-contained local labour markets, where by definition at least 70% of the population live and work
in the area. TTWA boundaries are non-overlapping, are contiguous and cover the whole of the UK.
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socio-economic backgrounds, the type of university attended and the subject studied. Our analysis
is conducted separately for male and female students because previous research has shown that
they differ in terms of educational aspirations and the risk of discrimination in the labour market.
We use administrative data collected by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) to
analyse the dropout behaviour of university students. These data refer to the population of uni-
versity students in the UK for the period 2004-2010, and we map information on unemployment
rates at the TTWA level from the National Statistics Office. Our base, or naive, model estimates
suggest that the policy reform increased the risk of dropout by 19 percent for males but had no
effect for females, whereas the recession reduces the risk of drop out by around 30 percent. We
also show that the hazard of dropout is not constant, tending to increase towards the end of the
first year. A richer story emerges when we apply difference-in-differences methods and distinguish
between students coming from ‘high’ versus ‘low’ unemployment areas.
Estimates show that in high unemployment areas the causal effect of the recession increases
the risk of drop out by 13% for males and 9.5% for females, and is statistically significant for
males but only marginally significant for females. The effect of the policy reform counteracted
the recession effect for males, so reducing the risk of drop out by 3.5%, whereas for females the
effect was positive (3.5%) and so reinforced the recession effect. The reform effects are smaller
than the base case estimates and the causal effects of the recession. Interestingly, and contrary to
expectations, in low unemployment areas, the recession also increased the risk of drop out for males
by 32%, and this effect is larger than the equivalent effect for students from high unemployment
areas, whereas for females the effect is negative (-5%) but statistically insignificant. This is as
expected. The policy reform had small counteracting effects to the recession for males but was
almost zero for females. Again this is as expected. In sum, males are more pessimistic about
prospects in the labour market, especially those from low unemployment areas, or the opportunity
costs of remaining in education are too high. Females from high unemployment areas appear to be
more debt averse.
We also find that for students from poorer backgrounds the reform effect dominates the recession
effect, increasing the risk of dropout, implying the presence of debt aversion. For students from
teaching intensive universities both the reform effect and the recession effect are positive and so
reinforce each other, implying that drop out behaviour is driven by a mixture of low expectations
about labour market prospects post-graduation and debt aversion. Differences by subject of study
are also observed. For students from high unemployment areas, the recession effect increases the
risk of drop out for students in both STEM and Business, but it is only statistically significant
for STEM. The reform effect counteracts the recession effect for STEM students but reinforces the
recession effect for business studies students.
In the next section of this paper we review the recent literature on dropout behaviour. This is
followed in Section 3 by a discussion of the evolution of the fee policy in England, and a detailed
discussion of our data. We then outline our econometric modelling strategy in Section 4. The
results of our analysis are presented in Section 5 which is followed by our conclusions and policy
implications.
2 Literature and hypotheses
2.1 A review of the literature
Theoretical models of the decision to attend university or not, and the subsequent decision to drop
out or not, are based on the solution to a series of optimisation problems that are well known in
the literature (Ben-Porath, 1970; Heckman, 1976; Oreopoulos, 2007). Individuals maximise their
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expected lifetime utility by choosing their level of education, conditional on the present value of the
expected lifetime wealth. These models emphasise the importance of risk, or debt, aversion, and
uncertainty about future labour market prospects, as well as other factors. The US literature has
explored the effect of these factors most explicitly and we discuss the findings from this literature
below, however, given our focus on UK university students we begin by describing the findings for
the UK.
There are, in fact, very few studies of the decision to drop out of higher education in the UK, and
most of the previous research is descriptive. Previous research has investigated the effects of family
background, prior attainment, personal characteristics and the subject studied at university on drop
out behaviour. For instance, Johnes and McNabb (2004) focused on drop outs from HE institutions
in 1993, and investigates the role of student-course matches and the effect of the student’s peer
group. Although it is difficult with these data to mitigate the reflection problem (Manski, 1993),
they do provide some descriptive evidence that males with low ability peers are more likely to drop
out. Students in higher quality universities are less likely to drop out. Arulampalam et al. (2005)
analyse the effect of prior qualifications, following eight cohorts of university entrants over the
period 1984-1992. Perhaps unsurprisingly, weaker students are more likely to drop out. Females
were less likely to drop out, and they confirm the negative effect of university quality on student
drop out behaviour. Vignoles and Powdthavee (2009) assess the effect of socio-economic background
using administrative data for 1st year students who enrolled at a university in 2004-05. Students
from families of higher socio-economic status are less likely to drop out; interestingly, students from
an ethnic minority background were also less likely to drop out. Although of less relevance to our
paper, there are many more studies of drop out behaviour at the secondary school level. Lofstrom
(2007), for instance, suggests that economic disadvantage, or family background, accounts for nearly
50% of the hispanics-whites gap in dropout rates. However, studies that use more sophisticated
econometric techniques, such as Ermish and Francesconi (2001) and Bratti (2007), find a limited
effect of family income on high school dropout behaviour.
There are several studies which explicitly examine the effect of tuition fee reforms in the UK.
Dearden et al. (2014) evaluate the re-introduction of grants in the UK universities in 2004/05. Us-
ing a difference-in-differences approach they find that the increase in grants raised first-year degree
participation (in 2005/06) by around 4 percentage points. Similarly, Azmat and Simion (2018)
investigate the socio-economic impacts of the 2006 and 2012 tuition fee reforms on enrolments, re-
location decisions, the type of institution to attend, as well as programme of study. They use HESA
data linked to data from the National Pupil Database for the period 2004 to 2013. Interestingly,
they find that the 2006 reform reduced overall enrolment at university by 1% but the decrease in
the participation rate varied by socio-economic (income) groups. They find a larger negative ef-
fect for the highest socio-economic group (-1.6%), whereas for the medium and low socio-economic
groups the effects were much smaller or neutral. Positive effects on enrolment of students from the
lowest socio-economic groups have been found by Murphy et al. (2018). They show that after many
years of widening socio-economic gaps in university participation, the gaps stabilised following the
tuition fee reform, although the gap between the highest and lowest socio-economic groups was still
large (i.e. 20 percentage points). Sá (2014) using a difference-in-differences approach investigates
the impact of removing upfront tuition fees in Scotland in 2001 and the increase in fees in England
in 2012. She shows that increasing fees reduces applications for programmes of study where labour
market prospects are relatively poor post-graduation, that is, those with lower employment rates
and wages. Her findings imply an absence of credit constraints insofar as the increase in fees in
2012 had a smaller effect on applications from poorer backgrounds and ethnic minorities. Crawford
(2014) illustrates important socio-economic differences in dropout, degree completion and degree
class for student from different family backgrounds, and she explains that they mainly reflect the
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level of human capital of students when they start the university.
The effects of financial aid on college completion has also been investigated for other countries.
For example Dynarski (2003) finds that the elimination of a student benefit programme reduced
college attendance probabilities by more than a third. Linsenmeier et al. (2006) show that the
introduction of mixed financial aid (loans and grants) has increased the enrolment rate of low-
income minority students. However, Nielsen et al. (2010) using Danish data find that subsidies
increase college enrolment but to a lesser extent compared to findings for the US. Arendt (2013)
estimates duration models to estimate the effect on dropout of a Danish reform that increased
student grants. He finds a reduction of around 50% in the probability of dropout for third and the
fourth year students. Therefore, by implication, one might expect the introduction of the tuition
fee reform, which has a prospect of higher student debt, may reduce university participation and
increase the risk of drop out because of debt aversion.
Taylor and Rampino (2014), using data from the British Household Panel Survey, investigate
the effect of the local unemployment rate on attitudes to education and the educational aspirations
of young people at ages 11 and 15. They show that young people do take external labour market
conditions into account when, for instance, considering whether to go to university. The effect
varies by socio-economic background of the pupils, insofar as pupils whose parents are highly
educated respond positively to poorer local labour market conditions, whereas the opposite is the
case for pupils whose parents are less educated. Attitudes and aspirations with respect to university
attendance also vary by gender, with girls being more positively disposed than boys. There is a
small but growing literature which has attempted to uncover a causal effect on high school dropout
behaviour. Higher rates of (youth) unemployment have been shown to increase the risk of dropping
out of high school (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999), whereas some studies show no effect (Warren and
Lee, 2003; Mocetti, 2008). Tumino and Taylor (2015) analyse the effect of local labour market
conditions on drop out rates from compulsory education at age 16, and explicitly consider the
impact of credit constraints. They show that credit constrained young people, reflected by parental
home ownership, are less likely to drop out at age 16. A one percentage point increase in local adult
unemployment rate is correlated with a 2-4.2 percentage point increase in the risk of drop out at
age 16. This implies that these young people are more sensitive to local labour market conditions
than non-credit constrained young people. Very little work has been undertaken for university
students, although Smith and Naylor (2001) using data for a single cohort of HE students in the
UK who enrolled in 1989-90, do find a positive effect of unemployment on the risk of drop out.
Adamopoulou and Tanzi (2017) study the effects of the Great Recession in Italy on university
dropouts exploiting regional variations in adult and youth unemployment. They find a positive
effect of adult unemployment on dropout whereas youth unemployment has a negative impact; the
net effect of the recession is a reduction in the probability of dropping out.
Belfield et al. (2018) investigate variations in labour market outcomes for UK graduates, and
argue that the decision of which university to attend and what programme to study are likely to be
affected by those outcomes. They combine administrative data from the Longitudinal Education
Outcomes dataset, which tracks students for 5 years after graduation, with HESA and other data.
Their evidence shows, having controlled for student characteristics, wide variations in the rates of
return to different degree subjects persist. The average student from a programme in medicine,
maths and economics earns 20% more than the average graduate, which falls to 10% for business,
computing and architecture graduates. The average creative arts graduate can expect to earn 15%
less than the average graduate. There are gender variations by programme of study insofar as
female graduates in medicine, pharmacology and English earn more than their male counterparts.
Earnings prospects also vary by the type of institution attended, with graduates from Russell
Group universities experiencing a significant earnings premium. Interestingly, employment rates
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are highest for students from more teaching intensive universities. Other research has investigated
the long term effects of graduating in a recession on mismatch earnings and the quality of jobs
entered (Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Kahn, 2010; van den Berge, 2018).
Specifically with regards to debt aversion, Rothstein and Rouse (2011) show for the US how
student debt can affect graduates employment decisions. They evaluate, in a very selective US
college, the effects of the replacement of students loans with grant aid to students in financial need.
They find that student debt reduces the probability of accepting low-paying jobs (e.g. in education,
government and non-profit sectors) and an increased probability of accepting jobs with high starting
salaries. Field (2009) offers a clear example of how psycho-social costs of debt can affect career
decisions, by looking at the effects of an experiment run at the NYU School of Law. Students
randomly selected in a lottery obtained income-contingent tuition fee waivers to be repaid only
if after graduation they obtain a high-paying (private sector) job. Students not selected obtained
tuition loans which were repaid by NYU if after graduation they decided to work in low-paying
(public sector) jobs. Thus the two packages of financial aid were equivalent in terms of net present
values and, according to the standard economic theory, students should have been indifferent to
the lottery outcomes. However, Field finds that graduates that received the tuition fee waiver were
more willing to work in low-paying jobs. This, they argue, can only be attributed to the different
perception, and the associated psychological costs, of the debt horizon between the two financial
packages.
These findings provide evidence that applicants, and most likely existing students, do consider
labour market prospects post-graduation. These studies do not, however, investigate in detail the
effect of the tuition fee reforms on the risk of drop out, and nor do they attempt to disentangle the
effect of the reform from the effect of the Great Recession.
2.2 The expected effects of the policy reform and the recession on student drop
out behaviour
Most of the previous research does not consider the underlying mechanisms which determine drop
out behaviour, nor how these vary by student characteristics. The mechanisms behind the recession
are: uncertainty about future labour market prospects, and the opportunity cost of education. The
total effect on dropout behaviour is given by a combination of these effects. The mechanisms un-
derlying the tuition fee reform are: debt aversion and liquidity constraints. An Income Contingent
Loan (ICL) system, including loans and grants, provides liquidity and reduces the constraints com-
pared to a mortgage loan system. However, the loan translates into a debt which has to be repaid
once the student has a job and receives a wage above the earnings threshold. This may generate
debt aversion, or a reluctance to borrow. It is also possible that there is a variation in student
responses to the recession and tuition fee reform based on personal characteristics and whether
they come from a high unemployment or a low unemployment area.
High unemployment areas. We expect that relatively higher levels of unemployment, as well
as the larger increases in unemployment, creates considerable uncertainty about individual (and
parental) labour market prospects, leading to a positive effect on dropout. However, a reduction in
dropout rates arises because the opportunity costs of education fall. Depending on the magnitude
of the effects arising through these mechanisms, the recession effect may be either positive or
negative. The policy reform may reduce the probability of dropping out because of the reduction
in the liquidity constraint provided by the ICL scheme. However, if students become more debt
averse, which could ensue for those with weak academic performance or from poorer families, then
the policy reform could increase the risk of dropout.
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We expect a similar recession effect for males and females, but a different reform effect since
females may be more debt averse given the existence of the gender wage gap in the labour market,
hence increasing their dropout rate. For students from wealthier backgrounds we expect the reces-
sion effect on dropout to be negative, since they are supported by their parents and thus have a
lower opportunity cost of education. The reform is also expected to reduce dropout, since liquid-
ity and hence debt aversion are relatively minor issues, whereas for poorer students, the recession
effect may still be negative, and counteracted by the reform effect. A deteriorating labour market
generate a lack of liquidity at the household level, increasing students debt aversion, consequently
increasing the risk of dropout. Negative effects on the risk of dropout are expected for the re-
cession and the reform for students from research intensive universities, or study STEM/Business
subjects, because rates of return are high. Students from teaching intensive (Other) universities are
more likely to drop out, since uncertainty regarding labor market prospects may outweigh the op-
portunity cost of education. The policy reform may reinforce this effect by increasing debt aversion.
Low unemployment areas. The opportunity cost of education is higher for the students from low
unemployment areas and it is likely to have a positive effect on the risk of dropout. However, they
face less uncertainty regarding future labor market prospects, which may therefore reduce the risk of
dropout. The reform effect may be positive if students are more debt averse, or negative due to the
lack of liquidity constraints. We expect that the recession effect is smaller in magnitude compared
to high unemployment areas, whereas the reform effect might be higher. Indeed, the decision to
drop out are less related to the labor market conditions but more affected by debt aversion or
reluctance to borrow. In terms of the different sub-groups of students, we expect the direction of
the recession and reform effects to be the same as those for students in high unemployment areas
but there are likely to be differences in magnitude.
3 Data and Institutional background
Students typically complete their compulsory schooling in England between the ages of 16 and 17,
and then proceed onto further study for A-levels or vocational equivalents which permit entry to
university. Universities set their own entrance requirements, and students select up to 5 universities
they would prefer to attend. There is a centralised admissions system, provided by the Universities
and Colleges Admissions System (UCAS) and all applications must be in the system by mid-
January in the year in which they wish to go to university. A matching process then takes place
from January where students are either rejected or made conditional offers of a place. However,
the final decision on acceptance by a university is made following the publication of exam results in
mid-August. For those students who fail to meet their conditional offers, they can enter a ‘clearing
and adjustment system’, ultimately either matching with another university or failing to enter HE.
Students can defer entry to university to acquire work experience and earn money to offset the
costs of university attendance, a so-called ‘gap year’. The imminent introduction of the tuition fee
reform may have led some students to postpone the gap year or, as the previous literature suggests,
some young people decide that the costs of university attendance outweigh the expected benefits
and so avoid university completely. Section 3.2 explores these issues further.
3.1 The Evolution of tuition fee policy
A tuition fee was first introduced for students enrolling at universities in the UK in 1998/99 when
they were required to pay approximately 1,000 GBP per annum. The Higher Education Reform
Act, approved in 2004, which was effective from the academic year 2006/07, raised the cap on
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fees to 3,000 GBP per annum in England. The 2006 reform represented a three-fold increase in
tuition fees and was targeted at students whose nationality was English or Northern Irish. Fees
at Scottish universities were unchanged, but English, Welsh and Northern Irish students studying
in Scotland were liable for the fee increase. Scottish students studying in England were subject to
the fee increase, whereas the tuition fee reform for students studying in Wales was introduced a
year later in 2007, and a substantial scholarship or bursary was made available to these students.
This increase applied equally to all universities and all undergraduate programmes. From 2006
students could defer the payment of fees by taking a Tuition Fee Income Contingent Loan (TICL)
up to the maximum amount of fees being charged. Repayment of the loan was linked to income
obtained after graduation, at a 9 per cent fixed interest rate for everything earned above 15,000
GBP and at a zero real interest rate. Hence, graduated students only repaid when they could
afford it.3 Nevertheless, students, parents and the wider public still perceive that students will
leave university with considerable debt. In fact, Table 1 shows that in 2009, the year in which
the first group of students on the TICL entered the labour market, only 128,100 students had
reached the necessary threshold, out of 780,000, to repay the loan. However, the perception of high
student debt was reinforced in 2012 when the government allowed universities to increase their fees
to between 6,000-9,000 GDP per annum, with most universities charging 9,000 GDP.4
Students did receive financial support through both loans and grants. From 1999 support for
living costs was entirely through Income Contingent Maintenance Loans (ICML), a quarter of which
were means tested. Some students also received means tested tuition fee grants. In 2004/05, to
help cover the cost of participating in higher education, the government introduced the Higher
Education grant, and this was fully means tested and non-repayable. However, this grant was
replaced from 2006/07 by the maintenance grant, which was a form of income-assessed support.5
Living expenses whilst at university also potentially leads to debt accumulation throughout the
academic year, and this may also affect the decision regarding when to drop out.
There are several aspects of the tuition fee loan repayment liability which should be highlighted.
The first is that tuition fee loans were paid directly to the university at which the student was
registered, however, for the period of our study if students dropped out before the 1st December in
the first semester at university then no tuition fee was charged. If they dropped out after the 1st
December but before the first payment from the Student Loan Company was received then they
were charged pro-rata based on the number of weeks they had been in attendance. Similarly, if the
students dropped out after the 1st February in their first year of study then they were liable for the
first tranche of student fees.6 The rules have changed since the introduction of a further fee increase
in 2012. However, for students studying in Scotland, there is published advice which corroborates
the previous approach to fee billing, as follows: ‘Your Tuition Fee Loan will be paid directly to
your university or college in one instalment, once they [the university] have confirmed you have [the
student] registered on 1 December. If you [the student] withdraw before 1 December no Tuition
Fee Loan will be paid’ (Student Awards Agency Scotland, 2018). Students receive guidance about
these rules in the terms and conditions of their contract supplied by the Student Loan Company,
and their university will provide additional guidance. The second feature of the loan is the liability
which accrued in three unequal instalments - 25% in Years 1 and 2 and the remaining 50% in
3Before 1998/99 loans were repaid on mortgage style basis.
4They also added a tapered rate of interest which would rise to 3% depending on earnings, and the earnings
threshold at which the loans start to be repaid was increased from 15,000 to 21,000 GBP. This ’debt’ will be written
off after 30 years.
5In 2016 the maintenance grant was also replaced by a loan.
6This information was obtained from our Student Registry, who apply the rules in invoicing students, and their
advice is that this was a system operated in the UK outside of Scotland.
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Year 3. The Student Loan Company provides written guidance to students when taking out a loan
and this specifically refers to this liability (Student Finance England, 2018). These features of the
student loan may have provided incentives for students to drop out before December in the first
year of study, or at the end of their first year, and consequently we might observe at least two spikes
in the risk, or hazard, of dropping out of university. However, evidence has shown that students
may be unaware of financial aid (Chan and Cochrane, 2008; Zarate and Pachon, 2006), and so it is
feasible that students forget about the tuition fee liability rules. If that is the case then we might
expect the hazard of dropping out to be flat. This is clearly an empirical issue that our methods
of analysis allow us to investigate.
Table 1 shows the evolution of fees and student support from 2003 to 2009. We note that,
although students could choose to pay fees up-front, the majority took out a tuition fee ICL from
2006.7 The percentage of students eligible and on ICMLs has remained substantially unchanged
(around 80%). The number of tuition fee grants drastically decreased from 2006 and they have
been partially offset by maintenance grants.
3.2 Data and descriptives
We use administrative data which refers to the population of students who first enrolled at an
institution of Higher Education in the UK between 2004-2010. The data were obtained from
the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) who had, in turn, obtained the data from each
university and institute of higher education in the UK. There are several important features of
these data. First, they record a student’s start date and end date and hence allow us to calculate
the duration of stay in education in days.8 Second, the data contains personal information on
age, ethnicity, gender, parental occupation, which corresponds to broad income status, as well as
information on the university attended and programme of study. Third, since the data refer to the
population of students there is no attrition which is a common problem in survey data. Finally,
we are able to make use of repeated cohort data for students who enrolled in HE prior to the
reform (2004-2005) and post-reform and recession (2006-2010) to investigate the hazard of exit
from university.9
There are various restrictions that we impose on the data. Students who enrol at a university
between 2004 and 2010 are included in the analysis, however, we restrict our attention to drop out
behaviour amongst first year undergraduate students. This is because most drop out occurs in the
first year of study, and we believe that the determinants of dropout behaviour are likely to vary by
year of study. The first year of study is the period in which students learn most about their ability
and either adjust, or not, to studying away from home.
Only full time students are considered since the dropout behaviour of part time students is
very different - part time students have a higher propensity to drop out, possibly because of work
or family reasons. Students who have been registered for 6 years or more are excluded. We also
exclude students who register for an undergraduate course but who have a prior postgraduate
qualification. These could have been data errors and where they are not, then they are likely to be
ineligible for student loans. Students aged 36 years or more are excluded from the analysis, which
7Tuition fee ICL were also available to pre-2006/07 entrants if they made a full or partial contribution to their
fixed fees, but we observe in Table 1 that the number of these loans are now negligible.
8We have analysed the end dates to ensure that they are not determined by administrative decisions of universities.
Dropping out occurs throughout the year which does not support the idea of an administrative driven process - see
also the baseline hazards in Figure 2.
9There are no publicly available data on dropouts by year of study, however, since we have population data we are
able to calculate the percentage of dropout by year of study. For the period 2004 to 2010, 68% of dropouts did so in
their first year, compared with 21% in year two. This demonstrates the importance of studying first year dropouts.
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means that we control for mature students who may behave differently to the typical 18-19 year
old entrant. Some universities place greater reliance on recruiting mature students, which provides
further justification for their inclusion. Note, however, that the average age of the mature group
(24.8 years) is still relatively young. We exclude EU and international students since they are either
subject to a different fee regime or we do not have data on their home TTWA. Students studying
in Wales are excluded because the policy reform started 1 year after that in England, and students
studying in Scottish universities are also excluded because of the different fee regime. In sum, we
retain UK students studying in English universities.
Using the students home postcode we map on to the student data a time series of unemployment
rate data at the TTWA level.10 The effect of neighbourhood on educational outcomes has been
extensively researched, however, there is no literature that we are aware that considers whether
individuals place a greater weight on the economic conditions where they are currently living (i.e
at university) rather than where they used to live (i.e. at home). Our data do not identify
the current residence, however, we argue that in our particular context, this may not be the
most appropriate measure of local labour market conditions. For instance, a substantial number
of English universities are located in inner city areas which students tend to cluster around to
minimise costs of living. These areas are ones where local unemployment rates are relatively high.
Also, a large proportion of first year university students live in campus halls, and so we would
observe a substantial clustering of these students in these locations. Choosing the local labour
market in which the student resides whilst at university may therefore mean that we obtain a
biased estimate of the recession effect. Also, given that the majority of our sample are aged 18, this
means that the proximity in time of the decision to attend university and leave their home labour
market, implies that 1st year university students are more likely to behave like high school students.
This is because these students will have far greater information about labour market conditions
in their home area than they would about the local labour market which they reside on entry to
university. Furthermore, a households experience of unemployment, which could influence the drop
out decision of students, is clearly a function of the home labour market. Our unemployment data
thus refer to total monthly unemployed claimants aged 18 years and over in the students home
labour market. They reflect local economic conditions with respect to job opportunities and wages,
impacting student expectations about the labour market prospects post-graduation.
To perform a duration analysis we need additional assumptions and restrictions. The survival
time to dropout is clearly discrete, since the event of interest can happen on any day of the year.
The time students become at risk of dropping out coincides with the start of the observation period.
Censoring occurs at the end of the first academic year, which we assume to be the 31st of August.
We also restrict the enrolment period to a twelve month time period and so the maximum length
of our observation period is 365 days. We aggregate the duration in days into 12 periods of equal
length i.e. ‘monthly’ intervals. Our final data set refers to over 1.8 million students.
Table 2, Panel A, reports the actual dropout rates by year (cohort) and gender. It is clear
that, on average, the dropout rate has remained fairly constant at around 9 per cent of the student
population up to 2008 when the drop out rate began to fall. Indeed, by 2010 the dropout rate was
almost two thirds of the rate of 2004. Comparing the pre- and post-reform and recession periods,
the drop out rate was around 1.4 percentage points lower in the post-reform and recession period.
Panel A also shows that there are differences in drop out behaviour between male and female
students - in the post-reform period the dropout rate for males falls slightly more (on average
1.6pp), compared to the pre-reform period, than for females (on average 1.3pp), but the absolute
10We exclude Scottish travel-to-work because a disproportionate number of them would be classified in the ‘high’
unemployment category, yet there are only 8% of Scottish students attending a university in England.
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dropout rate for males is still higher than that for females in the post-reform and recession period.
Panel B disaggregates the dropout rate by the socio-economic background of the students’
parents, where their occupation is collapsed into one of three groups - high, middle and low socio-
economic groups.11 These groups roughly correspond to high, middle and low income groups. What
is clear from Panel B is that all groups exhibit a similar percentage point decline in the dropout
rate following the policy reform and recession, even though there is still a clear ranking of dropout
rates by socio-economic group for each year. The decrease in the dropout rate for the low income
group is slightly higher from 2008, following the onset of recession, although this group still has the
highest absolute dropout rate when compared with the middle and high income groups in the same
period. The differences in drop out rates between income groups are between 1-2 percentage points.
Taken together these findings do not suggest any major difference in student dropout behaviour
between income groups.
The dropout rate for the broad type of university attended, classified here by the membership
of various ‘mission groups’ is shown in Panel C. It is worth noting that UK HE is highly stratified
and several ‘mission’ groups have emerged. The Russell Group of universities tend to be research
intensive, are generally bigger in terms of student numbers and typically have a strong science
base. Examples include Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial and UCL. The 1994 Group, which disbanded
in 2013, focused on teaching and research and include universities such as, Lancaster and Sussex.
Post-1992 universities which converted from polytechnic or college of higher education status are
essentially teaching focused, and these make up the majority of our ‘Other’ category.12 Not sur-
prisingly, the type of students who attend universities in each of the mission groups vary in terms of
prior educational attainment (e.g. A level scores) and, potentially, socio-economic background, the
greatest overlap occurring between Russell and the 1994 Groups of Universities. It is important to
allow for university type when trying to estimate the effect of the 2006 policy reform and recession
on dropout behaviour.13 We note that drop out rates are always higher in the ‘Other’ group of
universities and lowest for Russell group universities (see Panel C). Nevertheless, the decrease in the
dropout rate in the post-reform and recession period is greatest for the ‘Other’ group of universities
(i.e. 1.8pp) and changes marginally for the 1994 Group of universities.
Panel D shows how dropout rates vary by broad subject of study, where the focus is upon
STEM subjects and business studies. Drop out rates are approximately 1 percentage point higher
for business studies students. This may reflect differences in rates of return in the labour market
to different subject areas. Both subject areas witness a decrease in the dropout rate after 2006,
however, when compared with the pre-reform and recession period, the decline is greatest from
2008 onwards when the recession effect kicks in.
It is possible that students behaved strategically in response to the tuition fee reform by deferring
entry, switching the type of university that they wish to attend as well as the subject of study.
Students may be more likely to seek those universities and subjects for which rates of return in
the labour market are greatest (see Sá, 2014; Blom et al., 2015). Economic conditions also matter
for this decision, as suggested in Section 2.2, however, in this paper we choose to focus on the
impact of the Great Recession on drop out behaviour. It is clear from Panel B, Table 2, that
there was a slight dip between 2004-2005 in the percentage of students enrolling at university from
11The high income group includes students whose parents have managerial and professional occupations. The
middle income group includes students with parents in intermediate and technical occupations, small employers and
self-employed. The low income groups includes student with parents in routine occupations and unemployed.
12This group of universities also includes some pre-1992 universities. Note that we also allow mission group
membership to be time varying since some universities shifted from the 1994 Group to the Russell Group.
13Note that all universities are required to recruit students from poorer socio-economic backgrounds in an attempt
to widen access to university. Some universities are more successful in attracting these students than others.
11
middle and low income backgrounds. Specifically, we observe a small decline (around 1 percent)
in enrolments, for each income group, in 2006 when the policy reform was introduced. The high
income group were worse affected. This picture is consistent with the evidence provided by the
existing literature. Enrolments by income group pick up again after 2006. There is more evidence
that the policy reform was associated with a switch in the type of university attended - the reduction
in students attending ‘Other’ universities was offset by increased enrolments at Russell and 1994
Group universities. There is some evidence of falling enrolments into STEM at the time of the
reform but in the period of the recession enrolments in business studies and STEM programmes
increased.
Table B1, Appendix B, provides some descriptive statistics for the covariates used in our econo-
metric analysis. In addition to the variables discussed above, we include information on country of
domicile in the UK, ethnic background, and prior attainment. The latter is measured by a cate-
gorical variable which include quartiles of tariff score and lower or high qualifications in National
Vocational Qualification (NVQ) equivalents.14.
4 Econometric Methodology
Our interest is in the impact of the policy reform and recession on the incidence of, and time to,
drop out in the first year of study. Given this, let M be the time in months to dropout, which can
take integer values m = 1, . . . ,M and consider a sample of N students (i = 1, . . . , N). Define yim
as a dummy variable taking values 0 for all the periods a student i is enrolled at university and is
censored at time M , and coded 1 in the period m when dropout occurs.
The conditional probability of dropping out for student i at period m, given that event has not
yet occurred, is the discrete-time hazard
him = P [Mi = m|M > m− 1,xim] (1)
where xim is a vector of observed explanatory variables, which can be time-variant or time-invariant.
Following Jenkins (1995), we expand the data to enable us to estimate discrete-time non-
parametric hazard models. More precisely, we reorganize our pooled cross-sectional data in order
to have multiple rows of observations for each individual student with as many rows as the periods at
risk. Our final dataset has the format of an unbalanced panel. The likelihood for binary regression
models based on the expanded dataset corresponds to the likelihood for the discrete-time hazard,
and the predicted hazards are maximum likelihood estimates. We define the likelihood contribution
for a student i who is censored at time M as the probability




The likelihood contribution of a student who drops out in period M is









14The UCAS tariff score is a value obtained assigning a numerical score to the possible grades that be can achieved
in each type of all post-16 qualifications in the UK. Since the mechanism of computation of the tariff has been changed
in 2007, we report in our analysis the quartiles of the tariff score distribution, to have a more homogenous measure
over time. Furthermore, all the UK qualifications can be classified in NVQ equivalents, from a minimum level of
1 corresponding to primary education to NVQ 5 (post-graduate qualifications). In our sample we control for NVQ
Level 2, which are secondary education qualifications, and NVQ Level 4, which are higher education qualifications
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We now specify the form of the hazard function. The most common method for modelling
covariate effects for continuous-time hazard data assumes proportionality.15 As demonstrated by
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), the discrete-time counterpart of the proportional hazards model is
the complementary log-log hazard rate.
c log log(him) = log(− log(1− him)) = ximβ + f(m) (5)
where f(m) is the baseline hazard. In our model we use a piecewise-constant function by including
dummy variables for each period. Thus, within each monthly interval the duration dependence is
assumed constant. We estimate the following semi-parametric, discrete-time, hazard model (our
base model)
himt = 1− exp(− exp(dimα+ θ1Rt + θ2Uwit + θ3Rt × Uwit + ximβ)) (6)
where d are the duration variables for the baseline hazard, w are the local labour markets, or
more specifically TTWAs where student i is domiciled before enrolling at a university. U is the
unemployment rate in the corresponding TTWA in the month of August before the start of academic
year t. R is the policy reform dummy, such that:
Rt =
{
1, if t <= 2005
0, if t >= 2006
θ3 is the coefficient of the interaction between policy reform and unemployment rate. It mea-
sures the variation in the conditional probability of drop out after the reform for different rates of
unemployment in the TTWAs.
In our analysis, we generalize this model to account for any unobserved individual-specific
effects. Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity can generate misleading inference due to inconsistent
parameter estimators (Lancaster, 1992). In Equation (6) we therefore include a random intercept
ηi, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the vector of covariates, xim (Narendranathan and
Stewart, 1993).
himt = 1− exp(− exp(dimα+ θ1Rt + θ2Uwit + θ3Rt × Uwit + ximβ + ηi)) (7)
This new specification requires an assumption on the the distribution of the unobservable
individual-specific error term. Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2010) have provided Monte Carlo evi-
dence that a misspecification of the random effect distribution does not bias either the duration
dependence or the covariates included in the model.16 We assume in all our estimations that the
random intercept is normally distributed and constant over each time interval. For all models we
cluster standard errors at the student level.
15This implies that the covariates act proportionally on the underlying hazard function.
16They also show more generally that discrete-time hazard models are robust to different forms of misspecification
of the unobserved heterogeneity.
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4.1 Identifying the effect of the recession
To identify the effect of the severity of the recession on dropout we focus on the years 2007 and
2009; 2007 is chosen because it is just prior to the recession in 2008 but follows the 2006 policy
reform. From 2007 onwards, all students are subject to the ICL system and to the increased fee
regime. The year 2009 is just after the recession.
Given the above, we first compute the mean of the unemployment rate for all TTWAs in 2007,
and then look at the variation in the unemployment rate for each TTWA between 2007-2009.
TTWAs are classified into one of two categories - those above the mean are ‘high’ unemployment
areas, and those below the mean are ‘low’ unemployment areas. Then for each category of high and
low unemployment areas we compute the percentile ranking of TTWAs, according to the percentage
point change in their unemployment rate between 2007 and 2009. That ranking helps us to define in
a transparent way our comparison groups, symmetrically for high and low unemployment areas. In
the treatment group for each category we include the top ‘n’ TTWAs, that is, those with the largest
increases in their unemployment rate over the period. In the control group for each category we
select the bottom ‘n’ TTWAs with the lowest increases in their unemployment. Ideally, the control
group should include students in TTWAs where the variation in the unemployment rate is zero (and
hence completely unaffected by the recession), however, in practice, it is impossible to identify such
a control group. The size of ‘n’ can be varied to enable us to test the sensitivity of our estimates.
Initially, we select the top 25% of TTWAs for the treatment group and the bottom 25% for the
control group for high and low unemployment areas.17 We perform a sensitivity analysis where we
restrict these percentages to 20% and then to 15% of TTWAs.
We therefore estimate the following semi-parametric, discrete-time, hazard model:
hmt = 1− exp(− exp(dmα+ γ1Yt + γ2T + γ3 T × Yt + xmβ)) (8)
where t is the academic year, m = 1, . . . ,M time in months to dropout,
Yt =
{
1, if t = 2009
0, if t = 2007
T =
{
1, if a student is in a treated TTWA
0, if a student is in a control TTWA
γ1 is a year effect for the students in all the TTWAs selected for the analysis, and corresponds
to the naive before-after recession estimator. γ2 captures the effect of the recession on the risk of
dropout for students domiciled in a TTWA hit by relatively large increase in unemployment, when
compared to TTWAs where the unemployment remained relatively stable. γ3 is the difference-
in-differences estimate which should identify an Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effect.
This is the impact of the severity of the recession on the risk of dropout, for students enrolling at
university between 2007 and 2009 and domiciled in TTWAs that suffered a relatively larger increase
in unemployment. Equation 8 is estimated both for the high and the low unemployment categories.
17The number of TTWAs for the treated and control groups in high unemployment areas by region of the UK
are: Wales (7), Yorkshire and Humberside (3); Northern (5); North West (6); South East (9); South Yorkshire (2);
West Midlands (3); Northern Ireland (4); North East (3) and East Midlands (1). For low unemployment TTWAs
the equivalent figures are: Wales (11); South East (16); North East (1); South West (12); East Midlands (4); North
West (1); West Midlands (5); North Yorkshire (6) and the North (2).
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4.2 Indirect effect of the tuition fee reform
In the Introduction, we discussed the fact that to properly identify the effect of the policy reform on
dropout we need to observe the participation decisions of students at the end of secondary school,
in order to control for a potential endogeneity bias. With our data we cannot evaluate students
enrolment decisions, since we can only observe students that are already at university. Hence, a
causal effect of the policy reform cannot be estimated. Nonetheless, in our analysis we can provide
a conditional, and indirect, effect of the reform. This is derived by evaluating the treatment effect
of the severity of unemployment on two partially overlapping sub-periods, where the only difference
is assumed to be the introduction of the policy reform.
To obtain our estimate of the reform effect we adopt the same econometric approach explained
in Section 4.1. We now define the treatment and control groups for the time period 2005-2009,
which encompasses both the reform and the recession effects, and we estimate Equation 8. In this
context, the coefficient γ3 should pick up the effect on the risk of dropping out for students from
TTWAs hit by a relatively large increase in the unemployment rate and enrolled at the university
in 2009 under the new ICL repayment system. The coefficient γ1 should measure a total time effect
between 2005 and 2009. Summing up the coefficients γ1 and γ3 gives an estimate of a cumulative
effect on dropout, which includes the effect of the change in the tuition fee regime and of the
recession. We then sum up γ1 and γ3 using the estimates previously obtained from the estimation
of Equation 8 for the period 2007-2009. The latter effect, as shown above, should then only include
a cumulative recession effect. Finally, we compute the difference (γ1 + γ3)
(05−09)− (γ1 + γ3)(07−09),
and we interpret it as an illustrative measure of the conditional reform effect on dropout, assuming
that any other changes in student behaviour has remained constant over the period 2005-2009. We
replicate this procedure for the high and the low unemployment categories.
4.3 Evaluation of Treatment and Control groups
The DiD analysis relies on one important assumption, that is, the presence of a common trend
in dropout rates between the treated and the control group in the counterfactual situation of no
treatment. This assumption cannot be formally tested, however, we report in Figure 1 the variation
in the dropout rates for students living in the TTWAs included in our analysis and enrolled between
2004 and 2010. We show the trends for ‘high’ and ‘low’ unemployment areas, and we use for both
cases as a reference category the year 2008, which corresponds to the beginning of the recession.18
We can clearly see that in the pre-recession period (i.e. pre-treatment from 2004 to 2007), for both
the treated and the control groups there is a constant positive variation of less than 2 per cent.19
This evidence provides some confidence that the common trends assumption holds.
Table 3, Panel A, shows the number of TTWAs for each of the two time periods for high
unemployment areas; Panel B reports the equivalent information for low unemployment areas.
In each case, our selection of treatment and control groups gives a reasonably large number of
TTWAs, which is reassuring since it implies that our findings can be generalised. Furthermore,
we have checked the selected TTWAs to ensure that they are not highly spatially concentrated
(see footnote 17, above) in terms of the treated and control groups, and these are geographically
spread. We have also checked our choice of monthly unemployment rates and these are highly
serially correlated as are the annual rates shown in Table 4. This implies that our findings are not
likely to be sensitive to the choice of monthly or annual unemployment rate. Table B2 and B3
show the composition of the student body in both high and low unemployment areas, respectively.
182008 is chosen as the reference year because we seek to identify the causal effect of the recession.
19Note that the treatment is the severity of the recession, which affects all TTWAs but with different intensity.
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We consider the samples for those TTWAs in the top and in the bottom 25% of the unemployment
areas for 2005 and 2009. We do not observe any large differences in sample proportions over time,
or for high and low unemployment areas. There is some difference over time with respect to the
proportion of pupils from state-funded schools. A larger proportion of students from high income
families and students whose ethnic background is ’white’ are observed in low unemployment areas,
however, there is still a reasonable proportion of students from low income backgrounds in these
areas.
Panels A and B, in Table 3 also show the average dropout rates for high and low unemployment
areas, disaggregated for treatment and control group. Focusing on Panel A, the dropout rates
decrease by between around 1.5 and 2.7pp between 2005 and 2009, and the decline is greatest for
the treatment group. We have computed the raw difference-in-differences, and for 2005 and 2009
this is reported in the final row of the Panel, and shows that for males the risk of dropout declined
by a very small amount (-0.002) but increased slightly for females (0.005).20 These raw effects
should capture the recession effect confounded by the reform effect. Repeating the exercise for
the post-reform/recession period (2007-09) shows that the dropout rate increased more for males
than for females. These estimates should instead reflect only the recession effect. Differencing
the two sub-periods leaves the possible biasing effect of the reform on the recession effect. This
indirect reform effect suggests that the reduction in the risk of dropout for males was -1.4pp, which
compares with a very small negative effect of -0.003 for females.
The effects for high unemployment areas are similar to the effects for low unemployment areas,
except that the treated group experience the largest reductions in the risk of dropout between
2005-2009. There are differences between high and low unemployment areas with respect to the
combined effects of the reform and the recession, especially with respect to females. In sum, the
raw data suggests that we do observe differences in the effects of the recession (and policy reform)
for high and low unemployment areas, as well as for males and females. Whether these effects
persist once we control for covariates and unobserved heterogeneity remains to be seen.
5 Results
5.1 The effect of the policy reform and recession on the incidence and timing
of dropping out - base model
In Table 5 we report the results of our base model estimated immediately before and after the
policy reform. We include a full set of covariates together with the unemployment rate, reform and
interaction effect variables for all students in all TTWAs. We only report models with unobserved
heterogeneity (Equation 7), since the results for the homogenous models are almost identical.21 The
estimated effects on most of the covariates are signed appropriately and consistent with the existing
literature. There are very few differences in the estimated effects for males and females, exceptions
being the estimates for mature students and students from the Asian sub-group which suggest that
females are less likely to drop out; for males the effects are positive. For both males and females,
students with higher levels of prior attainment have a lower risk of drop out, however, females with
a NVQ level 4 qualification are more likely to drop out. Male students studying creative subjects
are less likely to drop out whereas in all other subjects the effects are positively signed.
20Note that these differences are not strictly comparable to our estimates below because they are simply means
whereas the estimates from the econometric analysis are derived from a duration model and then converted to odds
ratios.
21We also include the p-value of the likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis of zero unobserved heterogeneity.
Unobserved heterogeneity does not appear to be an issue in these models.
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Turning now to the variables of particular interest in this paper, we can see that the log odds
ratios suggest that for males the tuition fee reform increased the risk of drop out by 19 percent,
whereas for females the effect is positive but statistically insignificant. Similarly, students from
TTWAs with higher unemployment rates were more likely to drop out, although again the effects
are statistically insignificant for females. Also note that the effect of the unemployment rate is
lower in this model than the effect of the policy reform. However, for male students the interaction
effect between the unemployment rate and policy reform is negative and statistically significant,
suggesting that in the post-reform period students from areas of higher unemployment were less
likely to drop out; the effect for females is statistically insignificant. In sum, we observe different
responses to the reform by male and female students which may reflect differences in their attitudes
to debt or differences in labour market expectations. In Table 6 we restrict our analysis to the post-
reform period and we focus on the years before and and after the recession. We observe a large
recession effect which reduces the risk of dropping out by around 31% for males and 29% for females,
respectively. The unemployment rate variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on
the risk of dropping out, however, the interaction effect is not significant at conventional levels.
Estimates for all of the other covariates show a similar pattern to that observed in Table 5, albeit
with some differences in magnitudes.
To investigate further the effect of the policy reform and recession on the timing of the dropout
decision we have re-estimated our models for the pre- and post-reform periods, 2004-05 and 2006-
10 respectively. Figure 2 plots the estimated baseline hazards for the heterogeneous models, pre-
and post-reform recession, and for females and males, respectively. There is very little difference
between the estimated hazards in these two models. What is interesting, however, is that the
hazard of exit from university increases slightly in the first three periods of study, and it is very
similar pre- and post-reform recession, and then flattens off until period 8, after which it begins
to increase again for the post-reform/recession period. This is followed by a further increase in
the hazard in period 11.22 Thus, although students could avoid the accumulation of debt if they
leave university before December (i.e. by period 3) of the first semester, this part of the policy
reform had little effect. This is possibly because students do not remember the rules. However, we
do observe spikes towards the end of the first year, implying that there is a response in terms of
dropout behaviour with respect to debt liability increasing from year 1 to year 2.
5.2 Preferred model - A difference-in-differences approach
In this section, we present estimates from a DiD approach where we identify the causal effect of
the Great Recession on dropout behaviour, and the conditional effect of the policy reform. As
explained in Section 4.2, the treatment is a measure of the severity of the recession in terms of
its effect on the size of the change in local unemployment rates. Our results refer to the top 25%
of TTWAs in terms of the change in the unemployment rate versus the bottom 25% of TTWAs,
separately for high and low unemployment areas.
Table 7 reports the main results of this analysis for male and female students, separately.23 We
22Students may decide to drop out before they inform the university, reflecting the learning process regarding their
relative ability, and this may go some way to explaining the clustering of drop outs towards the end of our study
period.
23We test for equality of the estimated effects between males and females, and between each of the sub-group
in our heterogeneity analysis (see Section 5.3.2). This is not straightforward because our models are not nested.
Nevertheless we employ the full sample, and we include in our main specification a triple interaction term to evaluate
the effect on a given sub-group, for example Year×Treated×Gender. Our results suggests that there are in most
cases statistically significant differences between the sub-groups, adding further justification to the separate analysis
by sub-groups.
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show the coefficients and standard errors for the key variables, as well as the associated odds ratios;
we focus discussion on the odds ratios for the effect of the recession and the reform effect. Recall
that holding everything else constant, the difference between the cumulative estimated effects of
the reform and recession effects for 2005-2009 minus the cumulative effect for post reform period
when the recession occurred, that is, 2007-2009, should provide a conditional effect of the policy
reform.
Table 7, Panel A, focuses on high unemployment TTWAs. The interaction term Year×Treated,
columns 2 and 4 (ignoring variable names), is the causal effect of the recession. It shows that in
those TTWAs where unemployment increased by relatively more, there was a 13 and 9.5 percent
rise in the risk of dropout, when compared to the control group, for males and females, respectively
(see columns 2 and 4). The effect for males is statistically significant at the 10% level, whereas for
females the estimated effect is marginally insignificant. With respect to the effect of the reform,
for males we find that increasing tuition fees counteracts the recession effect reducing the risk of
drop out by 3.5 percent, whereas for females the reform has a statistically significant and positive
effect on the risk of drop out by 3.5 percent, so reinforcing the recession effect. The effects of the
recession imply that these students are pessimistic about future labour market prospects, and this
effect dominates the opportunity cost mechanism, especially for males. But, male students are less
debt averse when compared to female students.
A different story emerges when looking at Panel B for the low unemployment areas. For students
from these local labour markets, the causal effect of the recession increases the risk of drop out
for males by 32 percent, whereas for females the recession led to a 5 percent reduction but the
effect is statistically insignificant. The effect for males may arise because for these students the
effect of a higher opportunity cost of education prevails over the future labour market prospects
post-graduation. However, we do observe a small counteracting effect of the reform for males,
reducing the risk of drop out by two percent, with an almost zero (slightly positive) effect for
females. Overall, there is very little evidence of debt aversion for students from low unemployment
areas. The difference in the effect of the policy reform for high versus low unemployment areas is
consistent with predictions in Section 2.2.24 In summary, the reform effects are typically smaller
than the recession effects, and there are different behavioural responses to the reform for male and
female students.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis and heterogeneity
5.3.1 A sensitivity analysis
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our estimated effects of the reform and of the
recession to changes in the definition of the treatment and control groups. It is important to balance
the choice of control and treatment group against the need to maintain a reasonable number of
TTWAs in each group; the fewer TTWAs we select, the lower the number of dropouts that we
observe. Nevertheless, to test the sensitivity of our estimated effects of the recession and of the
reform we change the definition of how many TTWAs are in the treatment and the control groups
24We also conducted a sensitivity check where we use the youth unemployment rate to define the treatment and
control groups. The recession effect generally changes sign but the reform effect remain positive but larger. We believe
these results to be less plausible because, as we argued above, students are more likely to respond to aggregate labour
market conditions than they are to the conditions in the youth labour market. Unemployed 16-24 year olds are more
likely to be less skilled and less educated, and so university students will not see their circumstances as reflecting
the labour market opportunities they may face regardless of whether they graduate or drop out. These results are
available upon request.
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for both high and low unemployment areas. For example, we restrict the treatment group to the
top 20% worst performing TTWAs in terms of the percentage point change between 2007-2009
in the local unemployment rate, and the control group to the best 20% performing TTWAs. We
observe the two groups separately for high and low unemployment areas. The the same selection
process applies for the period 2005-2009.
Table B4 in the Appendix shows that the story is more or less consistent with that reported
above in terms of the sign of the causal effect of the recession, however, there are differences in the
magnitude of these effects. The recession effect is now positive for high and low unemployment
areas, albeit smaller in magnitude when compared to our preferred set of estimates, except for
the effect for males in low unemployment labour markets. The recession effects in Table B4 are
also not well determined and only one is statistically significant. Interestingly, the reform effects
are positive and statistically significant for students from high unemployment areas, implying the
presence of debt aversion, whereas they are negative and statistically significant for students from
low unemployment areas. Repeating the same exercise for the top 15 and bottom 15 TTWAs leads
to a loss of statistical significance on the recession effect, whereas the reform effects retain their
signs and statistical significance but the magnitude of the effects increases.25 These sensitivity
results imply that we have too few TTWAs as we go from 25% of TTWAs to 15% of TTWAs to
give the necessary variation in the data to accurately measure the effects of the recession on drop
out behaviour. There is also a concern about how generalisable our findings are when we use a
smaller number of TTWAs. We therefore prefer the findings in Table 7.
5.3.2 Heterogeneity effects
Table 8 repeats the analysis for our preferred sample of TTWAs disaggregating by socio-economic
group, since we argued in Section 2.2 that students of lower income families have different attitudes
to the ICL.
Columns 2 and 4 report the causal effect of the recession. Our findings suggest that for students
from high income backgrounds in high unemployment areas, the recession increased the risk of drop
out by 20 percent, over twice that for students from low income backgrounds (Panel A). The latter
effect is also statistically insignificant, and suggests that these students place greater weight on
the lower opportunity costs of continued education. Our findings differ to those from Tumino and
Taylor (2015), especially with respect to students from high income backgrounds, which is probably
due to the fact that undergraduates are at a different stage in their life cycle when compared to
11-15 year olds. For students from a wealthier family background, the tuition fee reform reduced
the risk of drop out by 8.8 percent, as expected, implying an absence of risk aversion, whereas
for students from low income groups the reform increases the risk of drop out but the magnitude
of the effect is very small. These socio-economic differences in dropout behaviour are consistent
with the other behavioural differences observed in the existing literature. Furthermore, the reform
effect nevertheless reinforces the recession effect for students from low income backgrounds, but
counteracts it for students from high income backgrounds.
For low unemployment areas there is evidence of a causal effect of the recession, which increases
the risk of drop out for students from high income backgrounds by 24 percent and it is statistically
significant. This finding is contrary to expectations. The effect for students from low income
backgrounds is positive, as suggested in Section 2.2, but statistically insignificant (see Panel B).
The reform substantially reduces the risk of drop out for students from high income backgrounds
(16 percent), whereas for students from low income backgrounds the tuition fee reform increases
25The results are available upon request.
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the risk of dropout by 22 percent, suggesting the presence of substantial debt aversion. Thus, for
students from high income backgrounds the recession effect is almost counterbalanced by the reform
effect, leaving a small net positive effect on the risk of drop out, whereas for low income students the
effects reinforce one another, implying a high positive effect. We conclude that students from low
income groups living in low unemployment areas are more interested in exploiting the immediate
returns in their local labor markets, and therefore see the prospect of additional debt as a burden.
In contrast, students from high income backgrounds may have better access to job finding networks,
hence the findings on the effect of the recession.
In Table 9 we report the findings for university mission groups. Recall that students from
Russell Group universities face higher rates of return once in the labour market when compared
to all other universities (Belfield et al, 2018). Also recall that the descriptive statistics show that
students from Russell Group universities are less likely to drop out when compared with students
from the ‘Other’ group of universities. Panel A of Table 9 shows that the recession had a substantial
effect on the risk of drop out for students from research intensive universities (i.e. increasing this by
65.5 percent), and is contrary to expectations, whereas the effect for teaching intensive universities
was a modest 1 percent increase. This latter effect is not well determined statistically. Since there
is sorting of students on the basis of academic ability between the two types of universities, it is
plausible that more highly qualified Russell Group university students from areas of high and rising
unemployment see their labour market prospects post-graduation as being bleak and take their
chances in the labour market and drop out of university. The effect of the reform reduces the risk
of drop out by 27 percent, which is insufficient to fully counteract the recession effect, whereas for
students from teaching intensive universities the tuition fee reform increases their risk of dropout
by 8.7 percent, which drowns out the recession effect. These findings therefore also suggest that
students who come from high unemployment areas, and who attend teaching intensive universities,
are more debt averse.
Panel B of Table 9 shows that the effect for Russell Group universities is smaller (i.e. a 12.9
percent increase in the risk of drop out) in low unemployment areas, but this effect is statistically
insignificant. This is to be expected because employment prospects are much better in low unem-
ployment areas. There is a positive and statistically significant effect of the recession for teaching
intensive universities, increasing the risk of drop out by 17.5 percent. The reform effect substan-
tially counteracts the recession effect for students from research intensive universities, reducing the
risk of drop out by 42 percent, implying an absence of debt aversion, whereas for students from
teaching intensive universities the reform increases the risk of drop by 4.5 percent and so reinforces
the recession effect. These students are therefore partly debt averse and partly sceptical about
their labour market prospects.
We turn now to the discussion of broad subject level differences in drop out behaviour. Table 10,
Panel A, reports the results for students who come from high unemployment areas. The recession
increases the risk of drop out for students in both subject areas, however the effect is larger for
STEM students (13.4 percent) than for business studies students, and the effect is statistically sig-
nificant.26 The reform effect reinforces the recession effect in the case of business studies subjects,
whereas for STEM students the reform has a counteracting effect, reducing the risk of drop out by
5.7 percent. Although this effect is not large enough to offset the recession effect, it nevertheless
implies that these students are less debt averse than their business studies counterparts. Interest-
ingly, the recession has a positive but statistically insignificant effect for STEM and business studies
students from low unemployment areas (Panel B), and the reform effect is negative and statisti-
cally significant but very small in magnitude in both cases. This suggests that these students are
26STEM refers to science, technology, engineering and mathematics subjects.
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not debt averse and are not put off by the deteriorating conditions in their home labour markets,
preferring instead to continue their studies in the hope of relative higher rates of return.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the effects of the so-called Great Recession, and the university tuition
reforms, introduced in 2006, on the risk of students dropping out of HE in the UK. The key
contribution of this paper is that we develop an approach to disentangle these two effects, and as
such we add to previous research which have either found no effect of the 2006 tuition fee reform
(Azmat and Simion, 2017), or positive effects in terms of reducing the participation gap between
different socio-economic groups (Crawford, 2014; Murphy et al, 2018). We are able to identify
the causal effects of the Great Recession, and the effect of the policy reform is given indirectly,
conditional on student participation in Higher Education.
We use HESA data on first year students who enrolled at a university between 2004-2010.
Duration modelling techniques are combined with a difference-in-differences approach. In our
modelling, we define the comparison groups taking advantage of differences in the initial conditions
in local labour markets, whilst also exploiting the fact that unemployment increased in a spatially
uneven way. The treatment group includes those students from areas more severely hit by the
recession, which is then compared with a control group, that is, students from areas where the
effect of the recession was relatively mild.
Base model estimates suggest that the policy reform increased the risk of drop out by 19 percent
for males but with no effect for females. When focusing on the recession effect only, we observe
a reduction of the dropout rate by around 30 percent. These estimates are at best descriptive,
however, these models do allow us to show that the hazard of drop out is not constant, tending to
increase towards the end of the first year of study. Therefore, the financial incentives to drop out
early following the introduction of the ICL do not appear to have impacted dramatically.
When we adopt a more rigorous difference-in-differences approach, our estimates show that for
students from high unemployment areas, the causal effect of the recession increases the risk of drop
out, especially for males. The effect of the tuition fee reform is small in magnitude and counteracts
the recession effect for males, so reducing the risk of drop out, whereas for females the effect is
positive and so reinforced the recession effect. Interestingly, for students from low unemployment
areas, the recession also increases the risk of drop out for males, and is larger than the equivalent
effect for students from high unemployment areas, suggesting that they place greater weigh on
the ‘higher’ opportunity costs of education. For females the effect is negative but statistically
insignificant. The policy reform had a small counteracting effects to the recession for males but
there is almost no effect for females. These findings are broadly consistent with our expectations
and indicates that males are less debt averse than females.
There is also heterogeneity in the effects of the recession and policy reform with respect to the
socio-economic background of students, the type of university attended and subject studied.
The evidence presented in this paper has implications for current tuition fee policy and practice.
From a policy perspective, it is clear that although the effect of the policy reform in 2006 was smaller
than the recession effect, there were effects on drop out behaviour for certain sub-groups of students.
These reform effects also vary in terms of the home labour market of the students. If we adopted our
modelling approach to assess the 2012 reform, which increased fees further (to GBP 6,000-9,000),
it is possible that a more substantial effect would emerge because perceived debt aversion would
likely be greater. In terms of the implications for practice, our analysis raises interesting questions
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with respect to the TEF, where first year drop out rates are an important metric, and with respect
to the so-called widening participation agenda, through which central government has attempted
to encourage universities to increase the participation and retention rates, especially of of students
from lower socio-economic groups. Universities have responded by supporting students from poorer
social backgrounds by providing scholarships and bursaries to reduce liquidity constraints even
further. Our findings could help universities to more carefully target and monitor those students
with a higher risk of drop out, and also suggest that universities need to look carefully at the
external labour market environment that help to shape student expectations of the future.
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Table 1: The evolution of the student financial support in the UK
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
tuition fees 1125 1150 1175 3000 3070 3145 3225
Loans
tuition fee loan:
students entering prior 2006/07
number loans na na na 158 99 32 5.6
students entering from 2006/07
number loans na na na 234 455 666 780
maintenance loan:
number eligible 840 874 897 905 928 963 1004
number loans 682 693 719 728 746 772 820




number full grants 321 327 315 190 102 32 6.5
number partial grants 109 100 92 59 31 9 1.3
maintenance grant:
full na na na 98 180 155 99
partial na na na 68 122 98 54
HE grants:
full na 83 160 127 77 24 5.2
partial na 19 36 28 17 5 1
Source: Student Loans Company. Tuition fees are in GBP, other figures are in thousands.
na= not applicable.
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Table 2: Analysis of dropout rates by year and characteristics
Panel A: Full sample and by gender
pre-reform post-reform
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
All 0.089 0.086 0.089 0.087 0.077 0.065 0.054
N 281323 297762 287597 297016 317255 334538 339156
Males 0.097 0.093 0.094 0.092 0.082 0.072 0.061
N 126727 133390 128394 132229 141510 150028 152182
Females 0.084 0.081 0.084 0.084 0.073 0.060 0.049
N 154596 164372 159203 164787 175745 184510 186974
Panel B: Dropout rates by socio-economic background
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
High income 0.069 0.069 0.075 0.072 0.064 0.055 0.045
N 117176 113443 105606 109835 111375 122211 125536
%∗ (14.6) (14.1) (13.1) (13.6) (13.8) (15.2) (15.6)
Middle income 0.082 0.081 0.083 0.083 0.073 0.065 0.055
N 54202 54676 51159 52732 56273 60423 60291
% (13.9) (14.0) (13.1) (13.5) (14.4) (15.5) (15.5)
Low income 0.098 0.095 0.100 0.102 0.088 0.079 0.069
N 33739 36292 35101 37818 46075 42933 46391
% (12.1) (13.0) (12.6) (13.6) (16.6) (15.4) (16.7)
Panel C: Dropout rates by type of university
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Russell group 0.052 0.046 0.049 0.046 0.040 0.028 0.021
N 64463 64801 66064 68349 71074 71182 71144
%∗ (13.5) (13.6) (13.8) (14.3) (14.9) (14.9) (14.9)
1994 group 0.072 0.064 0.075 0.074 0.062 0.052 0.044
N 32776 33037 34960 37496 39914 40114 40818
%∗ (12.6) (12.7) (13.5) (14.5) (15.4) (15.5) (15.8)
Others 0.110 0.106 0.107 0.107 0.094 0.080 0.067
N 172751 188862 180060 184395 199481 216376 220765
%∗ (12.7) (13.9) (13.2) (13.5) (14.6) (15.9) (16.2)
Panel D: Dropout rates by subject
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Business 0.101 0.102 0.104 0.098 0.086 0.071 0.063
N 30634 31034 30852 32797 36121 37543 36922
%∗ (13.0) (13.2) (13.1) (13.9) (15.3) (15.9) (15.7)
STEM 0.088 0.083 0.087 0.086 0.076 0.064 0.053
N 109912 114267 110803 116037 122801 132440 134698
%∗ (13.1) (13.6) (13.2) (13.8) (14.6) (15.7) (16.0)
First year entrants only.
∗Annual percentage of students enrolled over the 2004-2010 period.
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Table 3: Dropout rates by high and low of unemployment areas - Top 25% versus bottom 25%
Panel A: Dropout rate in high unemployment areas
group year males females TTWAs year males females TTWAs
Treated 2005 0.106 0.087 22 2007 0.097 0.089 27
Treated 2009 0.087 0.071 22 2009 0.084 0.070 27
Control 2005 0.099 0.084 22 2007 0.107 0.090 22
Control 2009 0.082 0.063 22 2009 0.082 0.063 22
DiD: 2005/09 DiD: 2007/09 Difference (2005/09)−(2007/09)
Males Females Males Females Males Females
-0.002 0.005 0.012 0.008 -0.014 -0.003
Panel B: Dropout rate in low unemployment areas
group year males females TTWAs year males females TTWAs
Treated 2005 0.076 0.078 29 2007 0.078 0.083 30
Treated 2009 0.059 0.056 29 2009 0.063 0.056 30
Control 2005 0.080 0.076 30 2007 0.084 0.073 33
Control 2009 0.062 0.059 30 2009 0.054 0.058 33
DiD: 2005/09 DiD: 2007/09 Difference (2005/09)−(2007/09)
Males Females Males Females Males Females
0.001 -0.005 0.015 -0.012 -0.014 0.007
Note: sample of 1st year entrants in English universities.
Table 4: Correlations between unemployment rates
Aug05 Aug06 Aug07 Aug08 Aug09 Aug10 Aug11
Aug05 1
Aug06 0.970∗∗∗ 1
Aug07 0.943∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗ 1
Aug08 0.925∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 1
Aug09 0.840∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.950∗∗∗ 1
Aug10 0.894∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 1
Aug11 0.896∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗ 0.917∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Estimates of the determinants of dropout behaviour - 2005 vs 2006 - Reform effect
Males Females
Heterogenous Heterogenous
Policy Reform 0.172*** 0.048
(0.054) (0.049)
log odds ratio 1.188*** 1.050
unemployment rate 0.081*** 0.015
(0.015) (0.014)
log odds ratio 1.084*** 1.015
Ref×unemp -0.042** 0.013
(0.021) (0.019)









Middle income family 0.010 -0.008
(0.026) (0.023)









Prior Attainment / school
1st quartile of tariff score -0.156*** 0.030
(0.037) (0.036)
2nd quartile -0.387*** -0.210***
(0.040) (0.038)
3rd quartile -0.696*** -0.450***
(0.044) (0.040)
4th quartile -1.197*** -0.803***
(0.051) (0.045)
NVQ Level 4 -0.031 0.082*
(0.042) (0.043)
Privately funded school 0.008 -0.082**
(0.034) (0.035)
Other school type 0.172*** 0.169***
(0.030) (0.029)
Mature student 0.020 -0.133***
(0.032) (0.033)
Type of University
1994 group 0.216*** 0.113***
(0.037) (0.035)
Other universities 0.408*** 0.306***
(0.033) (0.029)
Subject of study
physical sciences 0.151*** 0.084**
(0.030) (0.038)









First year entrants only, in English universities.
χ2p−value of LR test of model with Normal distributed
heterogeneity against model without controlling for heterogeneity.
Base category prior attainment: NVQ Level 2.
Base category subject: medical sciences.
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log odds ratio 0.689 0.712
unemployment rate 0.091*** 0 .062***
(0.016) (0.015)
log odds ratio 1.095 1.064
Recess×unemp -0.009 -0.019
(0.021) (0.018)









Middle income family 0.052* 0.020
(0.027) (0.024)









Prior Attainment / school
1st quartile of tariff score -0.025 0.147***
(0.040) (0.039)
2nd quartile -0.259*** -0.099**
(0.044) (0.041)
3rd quartile -0.582*** -0.336***
(0.049) (0.044)
4th quartile -1.006*** -0.622***
(0.056) (0.049)
NVQ Level 4 0.149*** 0.225***
(0.045) (0.047)
Privately funded school -0.067* -0.134***
(0.037) (0.037)
Other school type 0.152*** 0.136***
(0.037) (0.037)
Mature student 0.147*** -0.084**
(0.035) (0.038)
Type of University
1994 group 0.268*** 0.338***
(0.040) (0.036)
Other universities 0.525*** 0.416***
(0.037) (0.032)
Subject of study
physical sciences 0.204*** 0.114***
(0.032) (0.039)









First year entrants only, in English universities.
χ2p−value of LR test of model with Normal distributed
heterogeneity against model without controlling for heterogeneity.
Base category subject: medical sciences.31
Table 7: Effect of the reform and the recession (2007-09) by low and high of unemployment areas
- Top 25% versus bottom 25%
Panel A: High Unemployment areas
Males Females
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.195*** -0.253*** -0.320*** -0.340***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
log odds ratio 0.823 0.777 0.726 0.711
Treated 0.247*** 0.047 0.128*** 0.103**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.041)
log odds ratio 1.280 1.048 1.137 1.109
Year×Treated 0.030 0.123* 0.105* 0.091
(0.065) (0.063) (0.061) (0.058)
log odds ratio 1.031 1.130 1.111 1.095
N 570617 605924 728396 787896





log odds 0.966 1.0355
Panel B: Low Unemployment areas
Males Females
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.241** -0.465*** -0.294*** -0.286***
(0.113) (0.099) (0.100) (0.089)
log odds ratio 0.786 0.628 0.746 0.751
Treated -0.094 -0.172** -0.022 0.048
(0.087) (0.076) (0.074) (0.069)
log odds ratio 0.911 0.842 0.978 1.049
Year×Treated 0.032 0.277** -0.043 -0.052
(0.128) (0.115) (0.112) (0.102)
log odds ratio 1.032 1.319 0.958 0.949
N 268431 299151 336002 372816





log odds ratio 0.980 1.002
First year entrants only in English universities.
All models contain the same control variables as in the base model.
Recession effect columns 2 and 4.
a (Year+Interaction)2005/09 − (Year+Interaction)2007/09
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Table 8: Effect of the reform and the recession (2007-09) by low and high of unemployment areas
and by socio-economic status - Top 25% versus bottom 25%.
Panel A: High Unemployment areas
High Income Low Income
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.385*** -0.368*** -0.274*** -0.247***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.072) (0.070)
log odds ratio 0.680 0.692 0.761 0.781
Treated 0.225*** 0.127** 0.162** 0.085
(0.053) (0.052) (0.080) (0.074)
log odds ratio 1.252 1.136 1.176 1.089
Year×Treated 0.110 0.181** 0.114 0.084
(0.075) (0.072) (0.108) (0.102)
log odds ratio 1.117 1.199 1.120 1.088
N 546364 597412 181980 205259
LogL -17693.95 -18786.3 -7897.432 -8757.596
Indirect Reform Effecta
High Income Low Income
(2005-09)-(2007-09) -0.088*** 0.003***
0.000 0.001
log odds 0.916 1.003
Panel B: Low Unemployment areas
High Income Low Income
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.504*** -0.444*** -0.134 -0.450**
(0.117) (0.099) (0.209) (0.175)
log odds ratio 0.604 0.641 0.875 0.638
Treated -0.163* -0.120 0.045 -0.115
(0.086) (0.076) (0.162) (0.134)
log odds ratio 0.850 0.887 1.046 0.891
Year×Treated 0.099 0.219* -0.057 0.058
(0.132) (0.115) (0.230) (0.200)
log odds ratio 1.104 1.244 0.944 1.059
N 294627 337439 73752 79328
LogL -8511.549 -9784.802 -2835.041 -3264.462
Indirect Reform Effecta
High Income Low Income
(2005-09)-(2007-09) -0.179*** 0.201***
0.001 0.002
log odds ratio 0.836 1.222
First year entrants only in English universities.
All models contain the same control variables as in the base model.
Recession effect columns 2 and 4.
a (Year+Interaction)2005/09 − (Year+Interaction)2007/09
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Table 9: Effect of the reform and the recession (2007-09) by low and high of unemployment areas
and by university type - Top 25% versus bottom 25%
Panel A: High Unemployment areas
Russell Group Other Universities
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.508*** -0.513*** -0.225*** -0.227***
(0.091) (0.087) (0.031) (0.032)
log odds ratio 0.601 0.599 0.799 0.797
Treated 0.404*** 0.042 0.115*** 0.110***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.036) (0.035)
log odds ratio 1.499 1.043 1.122 1.116
Year×Treated 0.174 0.504*** 0.089* 0.009
(0.132) (0.128) (0.050) (0.048)
log odds ratio 1.191 1.655 1.094 1.009
N 305998 349534 813553 843508
LogL -6168.878 -6994.135 -38257.68 -39500.48
Indirect Reform Effecta
Russell Group Other Universities
(2005-09)-(2007-09) -0.324*** 0.083***
0.001 0.000
log odds 0.723 1.087
Panel B: Low Unemployment areas
Russell Group Other Universities
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.258 -0.264 -0.297*** -0.416***
(0.216) (0.166) (0.085) (0.078)
log odds ratio 0.772 0.768 0.743 0.660
Treated 0.285* -0.143 -0.125* -0.083
(0.160) (0.133) (0.064) (0.060)
log odds ratio 1.330 0.867 0.883 0.921
Year×Treated -0.415* 0.122 0.086 0.161*
(0.243) (0.201) (0.096) (0.089)
log odds ratio 0.660 1.129 1.090 1.175
N 144539 180617 367635 383190
LogL -2801.201 -3473.537 -14825.18 -16122.09
Indirect Reform Effecta
Russell Group Other Universities
(2005-09)-(2007-09) -0.531*** 0.044***
0.001 0.000
log odds ratio 0.588 1.045
First year entrants only in English universities.
All models contain the same control variables as in the base model.
Recession effect columns 2 and 4.
a (Year+Interaction)2005/09 − (Year+Interaction)2007/09
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Table 10: Effect of the reform and the recession (2007-09) by business and stem - Top 25% versus
bottom 25%
Panel A: High Unemployment areas
Business STEM
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.242*** -0.274*** -0.244*** -0.305***
(0.077) (0.078) (0.048) (0.047)
log odds ratio 0.785 0.760 0.783 0.737
Treated 0.082 0.061 0.239*** 0.052
(0.100) (0.094) (0.054) (0.051)
log odds ratio 1.085 1.063 1.270 1.053
Year×Treated 0.072 0.063 0.006 0.126*
(0.143) (0.131) (0.075) (0.071)
log odds ratio 1.075 1.066 1.006 1.134
N 123509 128445 468816 517984





log odds 1.042 0.943
Panel B: Low Unemployment areas
Business STEM
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.481* -0.541** -0.161 -0.340***
(0.278) (0.249) (0.134) (0.113)
log odds ratio 0.618 0.582 0.851 0.712
Treated -0.061 0.104 0.125 -0.100
(0.201) (0.182) (0.102) (0.088)
log odds ratio 0.941 1.110 1.133 0.905
Year×Treated 0.187 0.259 -0.120 0.061
(0.305) (0.277) (0.150) (0.132)
log odds ratio 1.205 1.295 0.887 1.063
N 45123 49500 221502 249186





log odds ratio 0.988 0.999
First year entrants only in English universities.
All models contain the same control variables as in the base model.
Recession effect columns 2 and 4.
a (Year+Interaction)2005/09 − (Year+Interaction)2007/09
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high income family 0.415 0.493
middle income family 0.2 0.4
low income family 0.147 0.354
NVQ Level 2 and below 0.068 0.251
NVQ Level 4 0.059 0.236
1st quartile tariff score 0.252 0.434
2nd quartile tariff score 0.206 0.405
3rd quartile tariff score 0.212 0.409
4th quartile tariff score 0.203 0.402
State-funded school or college 0.792 0.406
Privately funded school 0.106 0.308
mature 0.147 0.354
Rusell group 0.223 0.416
1994 Group 0.144 0.351
Other universities 0.633 0.482
Medical sciences 0.224 0.417
Physical sciences 0.154 0.361
Social sciences 0.204 0.403
Humanities 0.268 0.443
Creative sciences 0.151 0.358
First year entrants only in English universities.
Level 2 and below refer to students with less than A-level.
NVQ level 4 refers to students with a qualification higher than A-level.
Family income categories exclude unclassified.
Tariff score is a measure of prior attainment.
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Table B2: Descriptive Statistics - Top 25% versus bottom 25% - high unemployment
2005 2009
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
male .445 .497 .442 .497
female .555 .497 .558 .497
English .932 .252 .931 .253
Scottish .007 .082 .007 .081
Welsh .045 .207 .046 .209
Northern Ireland .016 .125 .017 .127
White .670 .470 .656 .475
Black .097 .296 .115 .319
Asian .151 .358 .146 .353
Other/Unknown .082 .275 .083 .276
high income family .375 .484 .384 .486
middle income family .203 .402 .204 .403
low income family .140 .347 .154 .361
Level 2 and below .068 .252 .074 .262
NVQ Level 4 .069 .253 .065 .247
1st quartile tariff score .222 .416 .230 .421
2nd quartile tariff score .215 .411 .207 .405
3rd quartile tariff score .227 .419 .223 .416
4th quartile tariff score .199 .399 .200 .400
State-funded school or college .755 .430 .823 .382
Privately funded school .108 .310 .101 .301
mature .164 .370 .154 .361
Rusell group .202 .401 .192 .394
1994 Group .118 .323 .126 .332
Other universities .680 .466 .681 .466
Medical sciences .215 .411 .228 .420
Physical sciences .156 .362 .159 .365
Social sciences .211 .408 .221 .415
Humanities .272 .445 .254 .435
Creative sciences .147 .354 .138 .345
See Notes Table B1.
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Table B3: Descriptive Statistics - Top 25% versus bottom 25% - low unemployment
2005 2009
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
male .436 .496 .445 .497
female .564 .496 .555 .497
English .907 .291 .905 .293
Scottish .008 .087 .008 .089
Welsh .085 .28 .087 .282
White .900 .299 .895 .306
Black .014 .117 .021 .143
Asian .041 .198 .043 .202
Other/Unknown .045 .207 .041 .198
high income family .456 .498 .461 .498
middle income family .206 .405 .21 .407
low income family .125 .331 .132 .339
Level 2 and below .055 .227 .064 .245
NVQ Level 4 .046 .209 .045 .208
1st quartile tariff score .235 .424 .235 .424
2nd quartile tariff score .223 .416 .221 .415
3rd quartile tariff score .215 .411 .230 .421
4th quartile tariff score .226 .418 .203 .403
State-funded school or college .771 .420 .851 .356
Privately funded school .114 .317 .107 .309
mature .126 .332 .119 .323
Russell group .220 .414 .207 .405
1994 Group .139 .346 .139 .346
Other universities .641 .48 .658 .474
Medical sciences .218 .413 .227 .419
Physical sciences .156 .363 .157 .364
Social sciences .177 .382 .184 .387
Humanities .284 .451 .269 .443
Creative sciences .164 .371 .164 .37
See Notes Table B1.
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Table B4: Effect of the reform and the recession (2007-09) by low and high of unemployment areas
- Top 20% versus bottom 20%
Panel A: High Unemployment areas
Males Females
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.212*** -0.244*** -0.302*** -0.347***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
log odds ratio 0.809 0.784 0.740 0.707
Treated 0.200*** 0.012 0.119** 0.074
(0.051) (0.066) (0.049) (0.058)
log odds ratio 1.222 1.012 1.127 1.077
Year×Treated 0.030 0.038 0.063 0.038
(0.072) (0.087) (0.068) (0.078)
log odds ratio 1.031 1.039 1.065 1.038
N 495023 435505 634163 559825





log odds 1.025 1.073
Panel B: Low Unemployment areas
Males Females
2005-2009 2007-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Year -0.207* -0.493*** -0.263*** -0.321**
(0.115) (0.141) (0.101) (0.125)
log odds ratio 0.813 0.611 0.769 0.726
Treated -0.068 -0.267** 0.026 -0.005
(0.091) (0.104) (0.077) (0.095)
log odds ratiop 0.934 0.765 1.027 0.995
Year×Treated -0.036 0.346** -0.124 0.018
(0.132) (0.157) (0.116) (0.139)
log odds ratio 0.965 1.413 0.883 1.018
N 225692 171271 284027 217521





log odds ratio 0.909 0.919
First year entrants only in English universities.
All models contain the same control variables as in the base model.
Recession effect columns 2 and 4.
a (Year+Interaction)2005/09 − (Year+Interaction)2007/09
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